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Transforming Legal Education in Japan and
Korea
Tom Ginsburg*
Looking back to the 1980s, the image of Japan, Korea and the other
Asian "Tigers" was very different than it is today. The Japanese
economy was soon going to surpass that of the United States, and
Japanese companies were buying Pebble Beach, Rockefeller Center and
other trophy properties. Popular books warned of the Japanese threat and
counseled Americans on how to cope with Japan as Number One.'
Other Asian countries were close behind.2 East Asia was viewed as
having developed an alternative model of capitalism, based on an activist
"developmental state" rather than the free market orthodoxy of Anglo-
American capitalism. 3 This model was deemed to be exportable, perhaps
even to the United States.
One key feature of this model was that it seemed to be a system of
capitalism without lawyers. Bar passage in Northeast Asia was
notoriously low, and practicing lawyers did not play the same prominent
role in business and government as in the United States. Prominent
commentators, including Derek Bok, then-President of Harvard
University, focused on the fact that there were about one twentieth the
number of legal professionals in Japan per capita as in the United States
and called for us to become "more like them." 4  If only our best
graduates, Bok suggested, became engineers like the Japanese rather than
lawyers, we would be better off.5
What a difference a decade makes. The Japanese economy spent
the 1990s bouncing in and out of recession. Professor Ezra Vogel,
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Program on Asian Law, Politics and
Society, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE (1979).
2. See, e.g., ALICE AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989).
3. CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982).
4. Derek Bok, The President's Report to the Board of Overseers of Harvard
University for 1981-1982, reprinted in 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570 (1983).
5. Id. at 574 (stating that "Engineers make the pie grow larger; lawyers only decide
how to carve it up").
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whose 1979 book Japan as Number One? heralded the earlier era of
Japanophilia, authored a new book entitled Is Japan Still Number One?
and answered in the negative.6 Meanwhile, the Korean economy
weathered a sudden and severe economic crisis in the mid-1990s, and
had to be rescued by the International Monetary Fund. Both countries'
economic models have been criticized as stagnant and corrupt, as
analysts excoriate many of the very features they had celebrated a few
years earlier.7
As politicians and bureaucrats in Northeast Asia attempt to resolve
their economic malaise, one of the most surprising elements is the idea
that law is part of the solution for Japan and Korea. Rather than focusing
on the United States having too many lawyers, the issue today is how the
countries of Northeast Asia can produce more lawyers. Legal education
is at the center of the debate over the role of law in ordering society and
the need to revitalize economic institutions. In both Japan and Korea, for
the first time, there have been proposals to develop three-year graduate
legal education programs. Sometimes called "American"-style legal
education, the new, controversial model has made inroads in both
countries, a rare development in any country outside the Anglo-
American tradition.
This story of the introduction of the graduate legal educational
apparatus into Northeast Asia is an example of importing legal
institutions from outside and provides a comparative context to
understand the conditions under which such transplants will not only
survive, but thrive. This article will first address the status quo ante by
describing the traditional system of legal education in Japan and Korea;
it will then discuss the new proposals for reform; finally, it will speculate
about where recent developments might lead.
I. Status Quo Ante
The status quo ante was, of course, more complex than the simple
imagery of "capitalism without lawyers" suggested. Although Japanese
and Korean capitalism may have functioned with a relatively small
number of lawyers, legal education was absolutely central to the systems
of governance. As in virtually the entire world, legal education was
primarily an undergraduate phenomenon and followed the German
concept that legal education serves as a pathway to bureaucracy, and to
big business, as well as to distinctively legal professions. Legal
education was high status, generalist training, rather than specialized
graduate, professional, legal education designed to produce practicing
6. EZRA F. VOGEL, IS JAPAN STILL NUMBER ONE? (2001).
7. Id.
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lawyers. At the center of the Japanese system was the undergraduate law
faculty at Tokyo University, which produced the majority of elite
bureaucrats as well as leaders in law, finance and business.8 Seoul
National University played a similar role in Korea.
In both countries, the bar exam was treated as a separate goal for a
very small proportion of those who completed undergraduate legal
education. Relatively few legal graduates tried to pass the bar, and a
very small proportion actually succeeded. The bar pass rates fluctuated
between two and three percent in Japan and Korea for most of the
postwar period.9 Most bar passers devoted additional years of study to
the process beyond the undergraduate degree.
For those lucky and talented few who passed, the bar exam was the
gateway to, rather than the end-point of, professional legal training.
Special institutions run by the Supreme Courts in both countries, called
the Judicial Research and Training Institute (JRTI) in Korea, and the
Legal Research and Training Institute (LRTI) in Japan, would accept bar
passers and train them together for a two-year period.10 Prosecutors,
judges, and practicing lawyers would be trained together, socialized
together, and then disseminated into the work force in their respective
fields. In sum, legal education was really divided into three different
components-undergraduate legal education, a series of "cram" schools
which would prepare one to pass the bar, and, finally, a special
professionalized legal education, which came after bar passage and
served as the only real practical training one would receive before entry
into the various legal professions.
In Japan, the bar exam was administered by a committee consisting
of a Justice Ministry official, Secretary General of the Supreme Court,
and a practicing attorney recommended by the federation of bar
associations (Nichibenren). In Korea, the exam was similarly controlled
by the Supreme Court. Exam passage was kept at 500 persons per year
in Japan and 300 in Korea. In Japan, the nominal reason was limitation
on the capacity of the LRTI building. In fact, the number was kept very
small intentionally, through a consensus among the government, courts,
and, of course, the practicing bar, which preferred to collect monopoly
profits from a restricted profession. Once admitted to the Training
8. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 58-62 (detailing career choices of Tokyo law
graduates and reporting that at one point 73% of officials at the level of department chief
or higher were Tokyo graduates).
9. See, e.g., JOHN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER 107 (1991) (Japan); Jae
Won Kim, American Law Schools in Japan and Korea: A Reform or Mockery? 5 (May
2002) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Law and Society Association Annual
Meeting, Vancouver, May 27-31, 2002, on file with author).
10. Subsequently reduced to 18 months in Japan.
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Institutes, prospective lawyers undertake a combination of classroom and
practical training, during which time an individual might work in all
three "branches" of the legal profession: the bar, the court, and the
prosecutor's office. This tends to facilitate a corporate identity among
the three sub-professions. 1
There are many implications of this model of restricted access to the
legal profession. It is fairly difficult to obtain legal services in both
countries, and much of the supposed non-litigiousness of people in each
society can be attributed to the lack of the ability to find a lawyer if one
is needed. 12 Furthermore, most lawyers are concentrated in the big cities
of Seoul, Tokyo, and Osaka. Many people also criticized the quality of
legal professionals. Beginning in the late 1980s and accelerating in the
1990s, pressure to change this system developed. The pressure came
from several sources. The Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court in
Japan wanted to increase the number of prosecutors and judges. Big
business began to complain about the lack of capacity in the legal
system. As the economy declined, more disputes emerged that
deregulation was decreasing government control over the economy.
When business is embedded in a network of dense relationships with its
workforce, buyers, suppliers, and creditors, disputes can be suppressed or
dealt with informally. The shrinking pie (or at least less rapidly
expanding pie) may have frayed such "social" ties and led to more
disputes. In Korea, democratization beginning in 1987 also contributed
to the. explosion of civil and administrative litigation. 13 All of these
developments reflected a sense that the institutions that had promoted
high growth were no longer able to function in the era of economic
decline, and trust in the government as a kind of steward of the economy
disappeared.
II. Proposals for Reform
The first step in meeting new demands was an expansion in the
11. Actual movement from one profession to another is rare in Japan but a bit more
common in Korea, where judges and prosecutors frequently retire into the private bar.
12. For variants of the culturalist thesis that Japanese and Koreans preferred to avoid
litigation, see Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in
LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren
ed., 1963); PYONG-CHOON HAHM, KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE
(1986); compare John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD.
359 (1978) and Setsuo Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima Seriously: A Review of Japanese
Research on Japanese Legal Consciousness and Disputing Behavior, 21 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 219 (1987) with Kun Yang, Law and Society Studies in Korea: Beyond the Hahm
Thesis, 23 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 891 (1989).
13. Jeong-Oh Kim, The Changing Landscape of Civil Litigation, in RECENT
TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 321 (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000).
[Vol. 22:3
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number of bar passers. Beginning in the early 1990s, both countries
gradually expanded the number of passers to the current levels of over
1000 bar passers a year. Nevertheless, the approach is still a quota
system, allowing only a certain number of the top exam takers to pass.
Passage is not a matter of setting a standard that anyone can meet.
The first Korean proposal suggesting the adoption of an American-
style, three-year graduate law school emerged in 1995 in the Report of
the Presidential Commission on the Promotion of Globalization. The
proposal was embedded in a broader program of judicial reform, but it
was the law school element that emerged as the most controversial.'
4
Opponents seized on the "American-style" nature of the institution and
sought to block the proposal.
In Japan, the proposal emerged later but gained momentum rather
quickly. A consensus on the need to expand the capacity of the legal
system to handle civil litigation had been gradually developing in the
1990s. A key juncture for legal education was the convening of a Justice
System Reform Council (Council) by legislation in June 1999,
constituted under the Cabinet a month later. After two years of
deliberations, the Council's recommendations were released on June 12,
2001 .5 The declared aim of the Council is nothing less than an overhaul
of the justice system and the increased resort to law as a means of social
ordering in Japan. Specific goals include: (1) the establishment of new
systems to process certain cases, such as labor, IP, and family cases;
(2) expanding civil execution; (3) lower fees; (4) adoption of a "loser-
pays" rule; (5) revision of the Administrative Case Litigation Law,
whose narrow approach to standing and justiciability restricts effective
judicial control of administration; (6) establishment of a public defender
system and other systems to improve pretrial detention; and
(7) development of victims' rights. As part of a transition towards a
"law-governed society," the report calls for an expansion in the number
of judges and prosecutors. The report also explicitly seeks to loosen
political and administrative control and move from "ex ante/planning"
toward what the report characterizes as an "ex post review/remedy"
society.
Especially noteworthy for our purposes is reform of the legal
training system, with a call for the creation of "law schools" to better
train legal professionals. 16  Even before the final report called for
graduate law schools, law faculties had begun to develop plans, and
14. Jae Won Kim, supra note 9, at 8.
15. Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council For a Justice System to
Support Japan in the 21st Century (June 12, 2001).
16. For details on the proposals, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Education and Training of
Lawyers in Japan: A CriticalAnalysis, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 491 (2002).
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momentum developed rapidly for inclusion of the plan in the final report
of the Council. A general concept of a new law school quickly
steamrolled into a massive effort by private actors, virtually forcing the
Council to push for realization of the plan. Legislation passed the Diet
7
in December 2002, existing law faculties submitted plans for the new law
schools to the Ministry of Education in July 2003, and charters were
granted to sixty-six out of seventy-two applicant schools in November
2003.'8 The law schools are expected to open their doors in April 2004.
Interestingly, although Korea was the source of the idea for having
graduate legal education, the plans encountered political difficulty there.
The primary reason was that the Korean bar was better situated than the
Japanese bar to fight the proposal. In particular, Lee Hoi Chang, the
head of the main opposition party and a former Supreme Court justice,
vigorously opposed the proposal. Judges were also opposed to it
because, unlike the Japanese judiciary, the Korean judiciary has
traditionally been seen as a point of entry into the private bar in Korea.
Japanese judges saw an expanded bar as an opportunity to increase the
number of judges, whereas Korean judges saw expansion as a threat to
their ability to retire into lucrative private sector positions. Because the
current system of legal training in Korea is controlled by judges, their
assent to the new plan would be crucial for passage. In short, the.
constituency for creating new law schools did not coalesce in Korea as it
did in Japan.
While the initial proposal was stillborn in Korea, the idea of
graduate law schools remains in play. Under President Kim Dae Jung,
the proposal resurfaced as part of an overhaul of the education system,
but official standards for the schools have not yet been adopted. At least
one Korean university has set up, on its own, a three-year graduate legal
education program with substantial English language instruction, even
though it is not completely clear how this will interface with the bar and
what the graduates will do.19 According to some involved in the process,
the goal is to establish Korean lawyers as legal professionals who can
serve clients all over Asia; it really is an effort at globalization by Korean
educators despite the fact that the government has been slow to approve
their plans.
17. The Diet is the Japanese national legislature.
18. Four of the seventy-two applications were rejected, and two others are pending
further review.
19. Handong Global University's School of Law, http://www.han.ac.kr/n-english
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
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III. Where Recent Developments Might Lead
While it is still unclear exactly what form graduate legal education
will take in Korea and Japan, the debate over legal education reflects the
perceived need by the legal professions in both countries to globalize, to
expand, and to upgrade their professional skills for a new, more
competitive economy. Whether or not the new systems will be effective
in meeting those goals is unclear. In my view, as long as there is a quota
system or a quota approach for admission to the legal profession, there
will be great pressure on legal education, of whatever form, to serve
primarily as a kind of bar preparation course, rather than as a truly
professional education that emphasizes skills. The quota system acts as
an artificial source of scarcity in the market for legal services, and even
the most talented applicants have an incentive to focus on passing the
exam rather than acquiring skills. Interestingly, the continued presence
of the post-bar legal training institutes, no doubt necessary as a political
compromise to ensure the passage of law school reform proposals, means
that the law school will not be the primary site for skills acquisition.
The mid-1990s reform proposals in Japan and Korea called for
nothing less than a complete overhaul of the systems of legal education
and training. Nominally "American" in style, the proposals were
indigenously produced and reflected borrowing rather than imposition.
They should be understood as reflecting local politics, as demonstrated
by the different fates of law school proposals in Japan and Korea. Japan
is moving headlong into an ill-defined transformation, while the Korean
proposal remains in limbo. The shifting focus of legal education in
Japan toward training professionals rather than generalists for the
bureaucracy and business, heralds a broader social transformation in
which lawyers are likely to be leading figures. 20  This transformation
bears close watching in years ahead.
20. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law's Dominion and the Market for Legal
Elites in Japan, Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-006 (2002),
http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2002/We
st02006.PDF, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 206 (2002),
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center.-program/law-economics/wpjisting./wp-listing/2
01210?exclusive=filemgr.download&file id=6989&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3Dw
p206.pdf (subsequently published in 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 451 (2003)).
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